From Fast Follower to Innovation Partner: The Evolution of Dealmaking between Global Biopharma and Chinese companies
July 21, 2026
For years, large pharmaceutical companies looked primarily to US biotech for external innovation, but that’s changing. China has emerged as an increasing source of novel drug development, reshaping how multinational companies fill their pipelines, structure their partnerships, and think about long-term competitive strategy. We've been watching this shift closely, and the evolution has been striking in both speed and scale.
Therapeutic Areas: Expanding Well beyond Oncology
Early China licensing activity was concentrated in oncology — particularly PD-1 combinations and competitive antibody engineering, including antibody drug conjugates (ADCs) and bispecifics. The therapeutic reach of the recent deals is much broader, spanning immunology, obesity, and CNS — reflecting both the maturation of Chinese R&D capabilities and the tendency for deal volume to follow validated mechanisms wherever they emerge. For example, one of the earliest non-cancer licensing deals among the 19 companies we follow* was AstraZeneca’s in-licensing of Eccogene’s oral GLP-1 receptor agonist in November 2023. Within two years, Merck, Regeneron, Pfizer and NovoNordisk had all inked obesity deals with Chinese companies.
A Meaningful Shift in Deal Structures
Early licensing activity between US / EU pharma and Chinese drugmakers was largely a value arbitrage play: multinationals typically acquired ex-China rights to individual China-originated assets at attractive valuations, while Chinese companies benefited from the capital, expanded global reach and late-stage development expertise their partners brought. The appeal was straightforward: Chinese programs often reach proof-of-concept faster and at lower cost, and the deal landscape was heavily skewed toward preclinical and Phase 1 assets in 2024.
But in 2025 and 2026, the center of gravity shifted. More transactions now involve Phase 2 and Phase 3 assets and have much higher potential value. In fact, the average value of deals signed by our companies in 2026 has soared to over $4.8bn compared with $2.1bn in 2024. Moreover, Chinese biotechs are targeting increasingly complex and novel mechanisms, and deal structures have evolved from single-asset licenses to multi-asset co-development partnerships — a signal of increasing confidence in the quality of Chinese innovation and clinical data.
Perhaps more significantly, the latest agreements are built on a deeper level of collaboration across the development cycle rather than just licensing rights across geographic lines. BMS/ Hengrui and Pfizer/ Innovent together represent total potential deal value of over $25bn spread across 25 clinical programs, with the Chinese partner handling early-stage development. In February, Lilly announced a strategic collaboration with Innovent to develop a number of cancer and immunology medicines. At the time, Innovent’s CEO said “This alliance moves beyond traditional licensing to create a seamless, end-to-end innovation ecosystem that combines our agile discovery and early-stage development engine with Lilly’s extensive global scale and creates a highly efficient model for cross-border synergy.”
Who’s Doing Deals — and What They Look Like
The most active dealmakers have been Roche, AstraZeneca, GSK, Novartis, Pfizer, and Merck, though activity has been broad-based across our companies.

The BMS/ Hengrui and Pfizer/ Innovent deals in particular have been characterized as global strategic collaborations and licensing agreements in which both partners contribute assets for co-development. BMS’s announcement of the deal highlighted that “the collaboration brings together BMS’s differentiated research and discovery strengths, global clinical development capabilities, regulatory expertise, and commercial scale with Hengrui Pharma’s discovery engine, platform technology and efficient early-stage development expertise…” Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla captured this aspiration as well, describing the Innovent partnership as combining "two highly complementary engines of innovation" that can accelerate the delivery of breakthroughs.
Growing Policy DebateThe extensive scope of these two deals has increased the scrutiny from lawmakers concerned about the increased flow of expertise and capital from the US to China. Thanks in part to a lobbying effort by some in the biotech industry, Congress is considering various bills aimed at increasing oversight and/or limiting investments in biotech ventures that could threaten national security.
Opinions are mixed about whether such policies would benefit the industry’s output of new medicines (and thus patients) or ultimately undermine the competitiveness of the US sector. For example, large pharma and smaller biotech companies view the situation very differently. As many multinationals have embraced Chinese partnerships as a source of external drug candidates to address patent cliffs and pipeline gaps, some smaller early-stage companies are advocating for investment restrictions and other protectionist measures. They argue that China's government has made an unlevel playing field. The development of its biotech sector is a strategic priority for China, and they have directed government funds and revised regulatory systems and standards to support the industry and accelerate clinical development. At the extreme, some industry observers are making the case that China has a national industrial policy that could ultimately lead to dominance in biotech as it has with rare earth metals and electric vehicles.
It’s no secret that China’s largest companies have aspirations to become global biopharma players. These deals have the potential to accelerate that progress. For example, Hengrui’s Chief Strategy Officer noted that the deal with BMS “reflects Hengrui’s continued commitment to strengthen our global presence.” Deep partnerships like this one have the potential to accelerate Chinese companies’ progress toward becoming global biopharma players by developing the global regulatory and commercial expertise needed to bring the products they develop into international markets on their own.
The counterargument is equally compelling: restricting US engagement with Chinese innovation doesn't eliminate the rise of China - or its ability to partner with companies in other countries. Protectionism also impedes US companies’ efforts to improve their own long-term competitiveness with other multinationals as well as Chinese counterparts. The question shouldn’t be whether to engage but how to balance any legitimate national security concerns with access to new therapies and the need for US biotech companies and regulators to continuously improve to maintain their global advantages.
There are two key threads worth watching, reflecting the two approaches:
- On the protectionist/ defensive side, the COINS Act (December 2025) restricts outbound US investments in sensitive sectors (primarily China), but biotechnology was not included in its initial scope. Treasury has discretionary authority to expand covered sectors through rulemaking without additional legislation, and several members of Congress have since pushed for Secretary Bessent to exercise that authority and add biotech. Bessent has yet to act, which prompted the bipartisan BINSA bill to formally amend COINS to add biotech as a covered sector. (BINSA has not yet passed.)
- Those that favor strengthening the US industry emphasize the importance of updating drug regulations to support more efficient reviews. In June of 2026, the Trump Administration announced a pilot program to accelerate early-stage clinical trials and potentially cut development timelines by six to twelve months — a direct response to the speed advantage Chinese companies have demonstrated in this phase of development.
Given the broad range of different opinions on the subject, the Senate Finance Committee Democrats recently issued an RFI asking how Congress can invest in biopharmaceutical innovation and "maintain American global dominance in biomedical innovation". In late June, the House Select Committee on China opened an inquiry into BMS and Pfizer’s use of Chinese clinical trial sites.
What This Means Going Forward
For now, the US is still viewed as the leader in global biopharma innovation. But China's earlier bets are starting to pay off, even as the US politicizes its own innovation ecosystem by cutting R&D funding, eliminating key agency positions, firing thousands of career scientists, and installing people with limited scientific experience in critical roles throughout the research and regulatory systems. The resulting damage will likely hobble the scientific community for years, weakening its capacity to produce advances that reach patients. This shift sharpens the policy tradeoffs and risks pitting large multinational pharma, early-stage biotech, and patients against one another.
Regardless of how Congress or the Administration act on proposed legislation or other activities, recent biotech deal flow has served as a wake-up call on the rise of China as a biopharma innovator. In our view, the best approach for lawmakers is not to restrict outbound investment and global collaboration or to isolate ourselves with protection policies that slow the advancement of medicine. Rather than shut ourselves out, we need to lean in or risk ceding more of our advantage – not just to Chinese companies, but to other multinationals that will fill our voice and continue to engage with Chinese and other global counterparts. At the same time, we should continue to embrace efforts that improve and modernize the regulatory process, and further strengthen the systems that enable the best medicines to reach all patients as efficiently as possible.
